Introduction
There was a drastic reduction in public spending in the OECD during the Nineties. Primary government expenditures declined from a cyclically adjusted, weighted average of 36.4 per cent of GDP in 1992 to 34.1 per cent in 1998. Since 1999, however, primary expenditures increased once more. Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of the average ratio of government spending to output in the OECD, using PPP adjusted GDP as weights. The solid line represents the ratio of cyclically adjusted primary spending to GDP whereas the dashed line represents that ratio including interest payments. Both reflect the spending cuts of the early Nineties. Towards the end of the sample, the primary spending/output ratio bounces back while the ratio including interest payment remains constant. • what are the quantitative implications of reduced interest payments for primary government spending and its composition? In particular, can the reversal of primary expenditures, shown in Figure 1 at the end of the sample, be explained by the reduced burden of interest payments?
We use an econometric model that makes it possible to compute the dynamics of government spending and long-run levels in the different countries for total primary spending and its components: government consumption, transfers and subsidies, and public investment. 8 1 8 2 8 3 8 4 8 5 8 6 8 7 8 8 8 9 9 0 9 1 9 2 9 3 9 4 9 5 9 6 9 7 9 8 9 9 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 3 Government Expenditures (weighted average -cyclically adjusted)
The analysis is fact-finding in nature. The purpose is to characterize the adjustment empirically, rather than to evaluate it normatively, as conducted for example by Buti, Eijffinger and Franco (2003) , or to propose changes to the current rules, as in Fatás, Von Hagen, Hallett, Strauch and Sibert (2003) . Galí and Perotti (2003) analyze the fiscal implications of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, and find that they did not reduce the ability of governments to conduct countercyclical fiscal policy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric framework for the analysis of aggregate primary government expenditures as well as the computation of the effects of the fiscal adjustments in the Nineties on the long-run ratios of government expenditures to output. Section 3 reports the empirical results. In Section 4 we extend the analysis by disaggregating primary expenditures into three components: government consumption, transfers and subsidies, and public investment. Section 5 concludes.
2.
Econometric framework for aggregate primary expenditure 
is the average growth rate in country , i the possibility of differential adjustment in i g during periods of high and low growth is allowed by using the dummy variable:
The main three factors affecting government spending at the focus of our analysis are: 
where it x is a vector of control variables affecting the level of . Note that in this specification, the adjustment starts at time i a t and continues thereafter. The total adjustment is captured by the accumulated effects, which will be reflected in the long-run ratio.
The long run
The long-run value of g i can be obtained from equation (1) as follows:
where the variables without the index t represent long-run values. The problem with using (2) to compute i g is that the equation involves , represents the degree to which a permanent change in one of right-hand variables affects the long-run level of government spending.
When the adjustment does take place during the sample, its contribution to the long-run ratio of government spending to output is
. If, for example, output growth is above average exactly half the time, the long-run adjustment is given by ( )
If the cyclical spending pattern is symmetric in expansions and recessions, i.e., Note that when checking for cyclical asymmetry, the simultaneity problem is alleviated if simultaneity is similar in expansions and recessions. For a further elaboration of this point see Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) , Appendix A.
output growth above and below average are the same, the business cycle does not affect the long-run . 
3.
Results for aggregate government spending
The data
The panel data set is composed of 18 countries, 12 of them in the EMUAustria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain -and 6 other OECD countries -Canada, Denmark, Japan, Sweden, United Kingdom and the U.S. Most of these countries performed the primary expenditure adjustment shown in Figure 1 , but some did not, such as Japan and Greece. The data are annual over the 1980-2003 period. The variable G is matched to primary general government expenditures, i.e., it includes regional authorities, and Y is represented by GDP. The source is the OECD economic data.
Estimation results
We report first a preliminary estimation of equation (1), concentrating on the adjustment variable A . For this purpose, the fiscal adjustment and cyclical variables are constrained to enter in a symmetric form, i.e., The variable A is introduced in three alternative formulations. One is based on the Maastricht Treaty. The dummy variable Maast takes the value 1 in the years following referendum approval in each one of the 15 countries joining the treaty, and 0 elsewhere. 2 We also used an alternative specification, excluding the three countries with a derogation status -the U.K., Sweden and Denmark -from the Maast variable. The second form is a dummy variable for all countries in the sample, taking the value 1 starting in a specific year during the Nineties, and 0 previously. Table 1 reports the results with the dummy variable for 1994, , 94 d which turned out to yield the best fit among the alternatives for 1991 through 1996.
The countries in the sample that joined the Maastricht Treaty are (the date of referendum approval is indicated in the parenthesis): Austria (12.6.94), Belgium (5.11.92) The third form is based on the Stability and Growth Pact: The variable SGP takes the value 1 in the EMU countries during and after 1997, and 0 elsewhere.
The results from this preliminary specification are presented in Table 1 .
The main results in Table 1 are the following. In column (1), the variable Maast has a negative and significant coefficient, but SGP does not have additional explanatory power. However, when 94 d is also included (column (3)), only 94 d has a negative and significant coefficient, Maast becomes insignificant and SGP appears with a positive and even borderline significant coefficient. Hence, it appears that the adjustment is a general OECD phenomenon, and not specific to EU countries. The positive coefficient of SGP resembles a partial reversal. The results are practically the same when we use the Maast specification that excludes the U.K., Sweden and Denmark.
In Table 2 we report the estimation of the complete specification of equation (1). The adjustment and cyclical behavior is allowed to be asymmetric; and the interest payments and control variables are included. The control variables are: The population growth rate, , ln pop ∆ and the fractions of the young (0-14 years of age), , young and the old (65 and older), , old in the population. In Table 6 in the Appendix, we report the inclusion of an inequality index. This variable is expected to have positive effects. Table 2 Aggregate Government Expenditure
The main results are the following:
• The estimate of α in column 1, , 6 . 0 − is large and significant, indicating a strong downward adjustment in government spending beginning in 1994. Column 2 reports the test of differential adjustment in expansions and recessions. One may expect that a downward adjustment in the spending/output ratio is socially and politically easier during expansions. The Wald test indicates, however, that the estimates of 1 α and 2 α are insignificantly different from one another. We also tested for differential behavior in more extreme cyclical situations, i.e., when output growth deviates from the mean by more than one standard deviation. In this case as well (not shown), the difference between the coefficients in expansions and recessions is statistically insignificant.
• The estimate of the ratcheting coefficient ( ) ϕ is close to being significant at the 5 per cent level. Hence, the evidence of a change towards less asymmetric cyclical behavior is weak.
• Another important result is the negative and significant coefficient of interest payments ). (γ A reduction of interest payments is followed by an increase in primary expenditures of 20 per cent of the amount saved in the following year. If the decline in interest payments is permanent, the effect on other expenditures accumulates over time. Below, we compute the long-run effect.
• The shares of old and young in the population are insignificant, but population growth has a positive and significant effect.
• The estimate of 14 . 0 = λ indicates that the convergence to the long-run value of g takes place quite gradually.
We also ran these regressions including only the 15 countries that joined the Maastricht Treaty in order to explore different behavior. The results, are similar to those presented in Table 2 . This supports the notion that fiscal behavior is similar in all countries in the sample.
We tested the possibility of an upwards adjustment of total government expenditure after 1998. This is done by adding a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after 1998 and 0 elsewhere. It turned out that the corresponding coefficient was not significant. This result suggests that the upward trend after 1998 is explained by the other explanatory variables.
Implications of the results
Here we address the dynamic effects of the results in Table 2 . The coefficients express the effects of the explanatory variables on the immediate change in the government's spending/output ratio. If the movements in the explanatory variables are persistent, the changes accumulate over time although this accumulation generates an opposite stabilizing effect via the term . Figure 2 illustrates the in-sample net accumulated effects of each of the main variables of interest since 1993. The solid line represents the cyclically-adjusted weighted average ratio of primary government spending to GDP. The cyclical adjustment is symmetric in expansions and recessions.
3 Using the coefficients in Table 2 , column 1, we then computed the hypothetical behavior of g in three cases:
(a) no adjustment in 1994, i.e., setting , 0 94 = d α (b) no change in interest payments, i.e., assuming that the burden of servicing the debt did not decline
The weights are based on PPP-adjusted GDP. This is the same variable presented in Figure 1 . since 1993, (c) no asymmetric cyclical spending, and hence no ratcheting behaviori.e., setting 0 ln = ∆ y from 1994 onwards. Figure 2 shows that without the adjustment introduced in 1994, government spending would have been more than 3 percentage points of GDP higher -the vertical distance between the no 1994 adjustment and the actual line. This is the source of the largest contribution to the change in government spending. A constant debt burden since 1993 would have implied that no funds would have been released to increase primary expenditure. The line for debt at 1993 level illustrates that primary spending would have been 1 percentage point of GDP lower. The line for no ratcheting represents the hypothetical spending-to-GDP ratio without asymmetric spending over the business cycle. Without asymmetry, the spending-to-GDP ratio would have been lower by 1.2 percentage point of GDP.
From the figure it follows that one of these two factors -(1) reduced interest payments or (2) ratcheting behavior -can be considered responsible for the spending rebound since 1998. The three lines -actual, debt at 1993 level, and no ratcheting -are at about the same level in 1998. The vertical distance between the actual ratio and the other two ratios in 2003 is about 1 percentage point, which is precisely the increase in actual spending from 1998 to 2003.
Expenditure decomposition
Here we focus on government expenditures disaggregated into three components: (1) consumption expenditure, (2) transfers and subsidies, and (3) public investment. The sum of the three components is somewhat lower than the total primary expenditure figures used in the aggregate analysis due to items such as capital expenditure, which are not included in the separate components.
Econometric framework
Given the results with aggregate expenditure, the adjustment in the Nineties is assumed here to be symmetric. 
The long run
The long-run ratios of the different spending components to output can be obtained following a procedure similar to that used for the aggregate spending case but now applied to the vector of spending/output ratios. In the long run we have: Similarly to aggregate spending, the focus of the analysis is the quantitative adjustment since the Nineties. The results will reflect not only the direct effects measured by the coefficients of the dummy variable for the Nineties on the estimation, but also the indirect effects from the interaction between the components (the crowding out of the individual category by spending on the others). The results are shown in Table 3 .
The results show the following:
• the direct effects of the adjustment from 1994 apply mainly to consumption expenditure and transfers, while the coefficient on investment is not significant; • transfers crowd out government consumption, but not the opposite; Table 3 Components of Government Expenditure (sample: 1981 Expenditure (sample: -2003 , standard errors in parentheses)
• consumption and transfers are countercyclical and asymmetric -and the corresponding coefficients are statistically significant. The results from aggregate spending, presented previously, reflect this behavior. For investment, the results are quite different. In high-growth years, investment is acyclical whereas in low-growth years, investment appears procyclical, with a coefficient that is almost significant at the 5 per cent level; • population growth has a strong effect on transfers and investment; • the share of the old in the population increases government consumption, but its impact on transfers is not significant at 5 per cent significance level; • interest payments have crowding out effects on consumption and investment.
The coefficient on transfers is statistically insignificant. The dynamic adjustment parameters are: λ The first column represents the long-run effects of an initial change in consumption spending (due to a change in any of the exogenous variables). The largest effect is on consumption spending itself, which spills over to transfers. Investment, on the other hand, is crowded out. The second column indicates the effects of an initial change in transfers: it crowds out the other two types of spending, mainly government consumption. An initial investment change, in contrast, crowds in both consumption and transfers. We can use the same procedure to compute the implications of population aging. Given the coefficient of the variable old in Table 3, Finally in this section, we report in Table 4 the long-run ratios of government spending to output in the 18 countries in the sample and, in parenthesis, the ratios in the last year in the sample. The computation uses the equation shown above together with: (a) the coefficients in Table 3 In half of the countries in the sample, long-run government consumption is higher than in the last year of the sample. For transfers, this feature characterizes almost all countries. Finally, for total expenditure in some countries (Austria, Denmark, Germany, United Kingdom and the U.S.), long-run values are similar to those in the last year of the sample, but for most they are higher.
----- Table 4 Long 
Concluding comments
We found that the government spending adjustment began in 1994, and that it can be characterized as an OECD phenomenon rather than as a phenomenon specific to countries participating in the Maastricht Treaty or the Stability and Growth Pact.
The spending adjustment was estimated to reduce the long-run ratio of primary spending to GDP by about 4 percentage points. As shown in Figure 2 , the contribution of this adjustment to average spending by 2003 was about 3.3 percentage points of GDP. We did not find evidence that the adjustment is carried out differently in expansions and recessions.
The results from aggregate spending indicate that a decline in interest payments generates a long-run increase in other expenditure that is larger by 1.4 percentage points. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that this effect is statistically different from 1. In any event, this result implies that in the long run, declining debt servicing does not reduce the total amount of government spending.
We found that the bouncing back of the average ratio of primary spending to GDP since 1998 can be quantitatively explained by either the reverse crowding out of the decline in interest payments, or the accumulated ratcheting generated by asymmetric cyclical spending behavior.
The analysis of the spending components indicates that the long-run effect of the spending adjustment was concentrated on transfers. The long-run effect on government consumption was estimated to be much smaller, and the corresponding effect on public investment was very small. 
APPENDIX
We also considered HP-filtered output as the cyclical variable (as in Galí and Perotti, 2003) instead of the deviations of the growth rate of output from their average value. In the following table, we define yd as HP-filtered ln(GDP), d ′ is a dummy variable with a value of 1 when , 0 > yd and 0 otherwise.
In general, the fit of the regressions is poorer than in Table 2 , as reflected by the lower 2 R and W D. . statistics. Other differences are that the coefficient of countercyclical policy in recessions is no significant here, and that the variable old is positive and significant. Table 6 includes a Theil index of inequality in gross wages in the OECD countries (Source: University of Texas Inequality Project). This index is available only through 1999. According to the results presented in column 1 inequality does not affect total government expenditure at a 5 per cent significance level. Table 6 Controlling for Income Inequality (sample: 1981-99, standard errors in parentheses)
